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Abstract  
The cotton sector has been amongst the most regulated in Africa, and still is to a large extent 
in West and Central Africa (WCA), despite repeated reform recommendations by 
international donors. On the other hand, orthodox reforms in East and Southern Africa (ESA) 
have not always yielded the expected results. This paper uses a stylised contracting model to 
investigate the link between market structure and equity and efficiency in sub-Saharan cotton 
sectors; explain the outcomes of reforms in ESA; and analyze the potential consequences of 
orthodox reforms in WCA. We argue that the level of the world price and of government 
intervention, the nature of pre-reform institutional organisation, as well as the degree of 
parastatal inefficiency, all contribute to making reforms less attractive to farmers and 
governments in WCA today, as compared to ESA in the 1990s. We illustrate our arguments 
with empirical observations on the performance of cotton sectors across sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Cotton is sometimes referred to as African ‘white gold’ (Moseley, 2008). It represents 
a crucial source of income in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), both for rural 
populations and for national economies.1  Due to widespread smallholder involvement, cotton 
is moreover considered to play a key role in development and poverty reduction (e.g. Minot 
and Daniels, 2002; Badiane et al., 2002; Mosely and Gray, 2008).  
Performance has been particularly impressive in West and Central Africa (WCA) and 
described as a unique success-story in the literature (e.g. Lele et al., 1989): yields increased 
more than three-fold on average since the 1960s (Table 1 and Figure 1).  
Combined with considerable expansion of the area under cultivation, this resulted in 
dramatic production growth: on average, cotton production increased more than twenty-fold 
over the past fifty years (Table 2, Figure 2). In East and Southern Africa (ESA), performance 
has been less impressive at the regional level (Figures 1 and 2). However, in some countries, 
notably in Zambia, production has increased considerably, at a pace comparable to those 
observed in WCA (Table 2). Between 1980 and 2000, Africa’s share of world cotton trade 
rose by 30 percent, while its average share of total world agricultural trade fell by 50 percent 
during the same period (Boughton et al., 2003).  
Historically, two key characteristics can be attributed to cotton production in SSA. 
First, vertical coordination has been widely promoted in SSA cotton supply chains. Indeed, 
the production of cotton is relatively input-intensive. As small farmers often do not have 
access to credit or inputs by themselves due to market imperfections, production has occurred 
almost exclusively through interlinked transactions, whereby cotton gins engage in input 
provision on credit in return for supplies of primary produce. Second, for cotton has been a 
major export cash crop for decades, it offered scope for taxation and collection of 
government revenue. As argued by Bates (1981), at the time of independence, the common 
view of many African governments was that the fastest road to economic growth was using 
agricultural surplus to support industrial development. The agricultural sector is also known 
for having been widely used as a source of rent distribution by neo-patrimonial elites (van de 
Walle, 2001).  
                                                 
1 According to Tschirley et al. (2009), in SSA, cotton is the main source of cash revenue for more than two 
million poor rural household and a major source of foreign exchange for over fifteen countries. In West and 
Central Africa (WCA), the cotton sector in certain cases accounts for up to 10 percent of the gross domestic 
product, 10 percent of total merchandise exports, and over 60 percent of total agricultural exports. Moreover, it 
is the largest employer in countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad or Mali (Townsend, 2006). 
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The combination of these characteristics has historically resulted in strong 
government intervention in SSA cotton supply chains, not only at the level of output 
procurement, but also of input provision, price setting, restriction of private competition, and 
investment in infrastructure and agricultural research. In WCA, parastatals have been in place 
since colonial times (in particular the 1950s). In ESA, state control of cotton supply chains 
rapidly intensified in the 1970s, after independence, through the nationalisation of cotton gins 
and the creation of marketing boards (Delpeuch and Leblois, 2011).  
State control of cotton markets has however been under pressure from international 
donors to reduce government intervention in the cotton supply chains since the early 1980s 
(Berg, 1981) and increasingly after the cotton price collapse of the end of the 1980s. The 
main reason behind calls for reform was the fact that price setting mechanisms do not allow 
producer prices to reflect world prices and thus distort production incentives. More 
specifically, state monopolies have traditionally been criticised for depressing farm gate 
prices. Conversely, in recent years, parastatals in WCA have been considered to subsidise 
producers to an extent that is generally agreed to be unsustainable from a budgetary point of 
view (Baffes, 2009a). In addition, inefficiencies in parastatal ginning have increasingly been 
a concern in ESA in the post-independence period. In some countries, such as Uganda, the 
cotton sector almost collapsed. Inefficiencies have also more recently become an issue in 
WCA (Tschirley et al. 2009). Finally, pan-territorial pricing schemes were considered to be 
ineffective in promoting rural development (Baghdadli et al., 2007). These factors, in 
combination with the strong dependence of millions of poor rural households on cotton which 
complicates reform, have been referred to as “the Cotton Problem” (Baffes, 2005). 
Responses to pressure from international donors and reform choices have differed 
strongly between regions in Africa. In ESA, cotton sectors were significantly reformed: 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe all privatised ginneries, liberalised prices and 
introduced competition in the mid-1990s. In WCA, resistance to reforms has been stronger.2 
Many stakeholders in this region believe that intensive cropping practices would not be 
feasible in the absence of state-supported integrated supply-chains with interlinked contracts. 
Past experience has indeed shown that state control of cotton supply chains has been much 
more successful in enforcing these contracts, by legally banning competition. In addition, 
                                                 
2 The geographical distinction between ESA and WCA in fact reflects more political/historical cleavages 
(Delpeuch and Leblois, 2011).  For the purpose of this paper, however, we build on this useful distinction and 
restrict our country sample to a set of eight emblematic countries (four in each region). 
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price stabilization is seen as a necessary instrument for risk mitigation and spatial 
redistribution (Araujo Bonjean et al., 2001). While private entry has been allowed to some 
extent in Benin and Burkina Faso, in practice, markets remain strongly regulated. In Chad 
and Mali, markets remain both publicly-owned and monopolistic. In all four countries, the 
government still intervenes in price-setting. 
These differences in resistance to reform may reflect the unwillingness of certain 
stakeholders in the processing sector or in the government to give up on rents, or a belief that 
reform would not be beneficial to farmers. This paper aims to contribute to the general 
understanding of the potential implications of liberalisation of WCA cotton markets by 
unravelling the implications of reforms in ESA and identifying the differences in pre-
liberalisation conditions between these two regions.  
Considerable empirical work has already been done in this field by a.o. Tschirley et 
al. (2009 and 2010); however, our paper goes one step further by assessing the reform 
impacts in a formal theoretical framework adapted from Swinnen et al. (2011). This 
framework integrates key institutional characteristics of agricultural markets in developing 
countries such as factor market imperfections, the absence of effective contract enforcement 
institutions, and the prevalence of linkages between input and output markets.  
The paper is organised as follows. First, we provide a brief account of cotton sectors 
in Sub Saharan Africa, with a focus on market organisation, reforms and performance in 
terms of yields and total output. Section 3 presents our conceptual framework, which is used 
to analyse the past cotton sector reforms in ESA in Section 4 and the potential implications of 
the envisaged cotton reforms in WCA in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Regional Trends in Institutional Reforms and Cotton Performance 
2.1 Cotton sector organization in SSA 
The cultivation of cotton requires the use of various external inputs that most 
smallholders cannot afford without resorting to credit. As credit access for smallholders is 
severely restricted in SSA, cotton production occurs almost exclusively through interlinked 
transactions, whereby inputs are provided on credit by the ginning companies.3 Such 
transactions are also referred to as ‘contract farming’ or ‘outgrower schemes’.  
                                                 
3 Although input use is less intensive in ESA, transactions are interlinked in most countries, with the exception 
of Tanzania, where less than 10 percent of farmers used any fertilizers before liberalization (Larsen, 2003). 
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This contracting has historically taken place in a regulated environment in most 
African countries of SSA. While market organisation varied considerably across SSA in the 
early decades of cotton commercial cultivation (1950s-1960s), it became “remarkably 
similar” (Baffes, 2005) in the post-independence period, when the degree of market 
concentration increased in the less regulated sectors. Competition between ginners was either 
ruled out by law, or very limited. Publicly owned companies or marketing agencies, which 
enjoyed both a monopoly and a monopsony position, were responsible for the purchase of 
raw cotton at regulated prices, its transformation into cotton lint and the trade of the latter on 
international markets. In Zambia, Zimbabwe, and all countries of WCA, single-channel 
supply chains were based on a parastatal, which also distributed inputs on credit and provided 
extension services.4  In Tanzania and Uganda, cotton purchasing and ginning was organized 
through village level cooperative societies and a marketing board ensured marketing and 
enforced market regulation (Tschirley et al., 2009). Regulation also included government 
intervention in price setting, and cotton prices were fixed pan-territorially and pan-seasonally 
(i.e. the producer price was fixed throughout the country and throughout the year). 
The major advantage of such single-channel systems is the prevention of ‘side-
selling’, where farmers sell their cotton to other higher-bidding buyers at harvest, instead of 
to the company that has pre-financed their inputs. In WCA, where single-channel systems 
had been set up by the colonial rulers, successful input provision schemes for cotton 
production were maintained after independence, with positive spillovers for food crops 
through improved access to inputs as well as crop rotation (e. g. Chapter  III in Hussein et al., 
2006).5  For several decades, cotton parastatals in WCA have been perceived as relatively 
efficient, even by proponents of orthodox market institutions.6 However, the cotton price 
collapse at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s led the World Bank to advocate liberalisation 
of WCA cotton markets more fiercely (Badiane et al. 2002). Apart from the reasons 
mentioned above, it was argued that the strengthening of competitiveness of these sectors 
                                                 
4 Especially in WCA, the parastatal would also be responsible for developing new seeds (to varying degrees, 
with public budget support), distributing inputs on credit, providing technical advice to farmers, taking care of 
relevant infrastructures, and sometimes, even building schools and dispensaries. 
5 In Benin, for example, according to a 1998 farm survey, 97 percent of cotton growers used fertilizer, which 
they all purchased on credit through the cotton parastatal, while only 24 percent of other farmers did (IFPRI and 
LARES, 2001). 
6 The Berg report, considered to be the reference paper for World Bank adjustment programs in developing 
countries’ agricultural markets, notes: “some of the smallholder cotton growing schemes in francophone African 
countries are organized by agencies with mixed private-public ownership and are among the more successful 
ventures on the continent” (Berg, 1981). 
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would be vital in ensuring their long-term financial sustainability and allowing a fair division 
of the profits between producers and ginners.  
 
2.2 Reforms 
Market organisation hence began to change in the late-1980s, with a drastic 
acceleration of reforms in the mid-1990s in ESA. Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
all dissolved cotton boards and allowed private sector competition in the early to mid 1990s.  
In Tanzania the reform process started with the elimination of pan-territorial and pan-
seasonal price-setting in 1992. In 1995, the sector was opened up, and the private sector 
entered progressively in cotton processing and distribution (Poulton, 2009). This is the year 
which we consider as the year of liberalisation. 
In Uganda, the board was liquidated and the sector opened up to private entry in 1994 
such that new buyers progressively competed with cooperative unions.  
Liberalisation also took place in 1994 in Zambia, when the state cotton board was 
privatized. However, after liberalisation, competition initially remained very limited. The 
state ginneries were sold to two companies, which benefited of de facto regional monopsony 
power until 1997. New small firms and independent traders then emerged and started to 
compete for cotton supplies.  
Finally, in Zimbabwe, the cotton sector opened up to private entry in 1994, the year of 
liberalisation, and the state board was privatized a few years later in 1997. Still, the level of 
competition has remained modest until the early 2000s. The degree of competition increased 
in 2001 when several smaller firms entered the ginning market (Poulton and Hanyani-
Mlambo, 2009).7  
In WCA, reforms have been more recent and of a much more restricted scope. Prices 
have not been liberalised in any of the countries under consideration. Even though private 
entry has been allowed to some extent in Benin and Burkina Faso (resp. in 1995 and 2000), 
competition remains weak at best. In Burkina Faso, each of the three cotton companies has 
been allotted local monopsony rights for the purchase of cotton in a particular region while, 
in Benin, seed cotton is allocated administratively to cotton ginners. In Chad and Mali, 
                                                 
7 In theory, input provision has become a requirement for ‘cotton contractors’, who in exchange, are guaranteed 
of buying the crop ahead of other firms. The system is however reported to function relatively poorly, with 
several companies failing to provide the required inputs. 
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parastatal governance of cotton markets has not been touched upon as yet, even though 
reforms have been discussed for several years (Delpeuch and Leblois, 2011).  
 
2.3 Performance 
Cotton sector performance has widely varied across sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
trends emerge at the regional level. First, in the post-independence era, in the 1970s and 
1980s, WCA performed clearly better than ESA. Both productivity and output growth were 
strongly positive in all countries of WCA until the late 1980s with yields and production 
tripling, on average, compared to the 1960s (Tables 1 and 2). In ESA, on the other hand, 
average yields decreased in the 1970s and 1980s (Table 1) and a broadly stagnating average 
output growth hides strong differences between countries: while Zambia and Zimbabwe 
displayed high output growth, production almost collapsed in Uganda (Table 2).  
With regard to the last two decades, when reforms were implemented to a far greater 
extent in ESA, the picture is less clear. Productivity has broadly stagnated on average in 
WCA (Figure 1). Yields continued to grow, at a lower pace, in Burkina Faso and, to a lesser 
extent, in Benin.  However, they decreased in Chad and in Mali (Table 1). Conversely, in 
ESA, productivity growth has slowly resumed in the last decade, except in Zimbabwe where 
it has been almost halved compared to the 1980s average (Table 1). Output growth, on the 
other hand, has remained much higher, on average, in WCA than in ESA (Figure 2), driven 
mainly by increased area under cultivation. While Chad is the only exception to the cotton-
boom in WCA, Zambia is an exception in ESA with output growth rates comparable to those 
witnessed in WCA (Table 2). 
Tschirley et al. (2009 and 2010) explicitly establish a link between market 
organisation and different elements of performance.8 They argue that competitive, market-
based systems could enhance production by involving relatively high producer prices without 
any type of budgetary support but that they mostly fail in the provision of inputs and 
extension. Monopolistic and concentrated sectors, on the other hand, are better in providing 
inputs and services to farmers, although the latter tend to cover fewer farmers than the 
former. However, while prices can be high in monopolistic markets – even higher than in 
competitive markets – this can be at the cost of huge public transfers. As a result, Tschirley et 
                                                 
8 One of these elements, which we do not discuss in this paper, is cotton quality (Larsen, 2003; Gilbert and 
Tollens and Gilbert, 2003). 
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al. (2009 and 2010) maintain that no market sector type seems to have performed so well that 
it can be used as a reference for other countries.  
To complement these findings, we now turn to analyze the past reforms in ESA using 
the theoretical model adapted from Swinnen et al. (2011). After outlining the model 
predictions, we contrast these theoretical findings with a more detailed analysis of post-
reform performance in ESA. 
 
3. Conceptual framework  
3.1 A Model of liberalisation 
The required inputs for cotton production are labour on the one hand, and capital on 
the other hand. We assume the required inputs are not directly available to the farmer because 
of market imperfections. Conversely, processors do not have the skill (or land) to produce 
directly. However, processors have better access to credit and/or inputs, such that they can 
provide inputs on credit to farmers. A farmer and a processor can thus join forces to produce 
an amount q of cotton: the farmer will provide labour l, the processor will provide inputs of 
value k.9 The farmer’s opportunity cost of labour ( ) equals his disagreement payoff, i.e. his 
income when the contract does not materialise, and is an indicator of his alternative 
opportunities.10 The processor’s opportunity cost of exporting cotton ( ) is his opportunity 
cost of using the capital for cotton exports rather than for any other investment.11 His 
processing and marketing costs are assumed to be equal to the market valuation of processing 
and marketing. 
Inefficient processors face extra processing and marketing costs, denoted by c. These 
costs may encompass different inefficiencies such as excessive transport and storage costs 
(Kherallah et al. 2003) or poor sales strategies, management tools, and technology (Baffes, 
2007). They could also reflect, for example, the fact that parastatals have a record of serving 
as job providers to politicians needing to reward political support.  
                                                 
9 Note that we assume an indivisible production function and a fixed proportions production technology as well 
as perfect information (production, price and market risks are thus not considered). 
10 For example, if the farmer’s only ex ante outside option is to produce food crops for the local market,  then   
equals the product of their quantity and their sales price. Alternatively   can reflect the lower quantity of cotton 
that can be produced without inputs. The value of    increases if the farmer has better alternative opportunities.   
11  depends both on the capital intensity of cotton cultivation, and on the buyer’s potential return to alternative 
investments. 
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Finally, to account for government intervention in price setting, t represents a 
government tax (t > 0) or subsidy (t < 0).12 The processor exports the cotton lint at price p, 
the exogenous world price for cotton.13 The net value that is created if a contract is agreed 
and enforced, the “surplus”, is denoted by θ, with 
 θ = q(p – c – t) –  –          (1) 
Under perfect and costless enforcement conditions, if a surplus is realised (i.e. θ > 0), 
it is shared according to a simple Nash bargaining process, in which total payoffs are 
obtained by adding each agent’s outside option to his share of θ (Nash, 1953). The farmer 
will then receive share β, while the processor appropriates share 1 – β. In this way, β can be 
considered as the farmer’s bargaining power under perfect enforcement.14 
To account for the fact that, in most of rural SSA, credible contract enforcement is 
however often unaffordable (among other reasons because of the oral nature of many 
arrangements, the low volume of individual transactions, the geographical dispersion of 
agents and the weakness of judiciary systems), we consider the extreme case that there is no 
external enforcement mechanism and show how the respective pay-offs are affected.15 This 
implies that after the farmer accepts a processor’s offer for inputs, he can still decide ex-post 
(i) whether to use the inputs for cotton production or to divert them (by selling them or using 
them on other crops) and (ii) if cotton is produced, whether to supply it to the contracting party 
or side-sell, that is, sell its cotton to an alternative buyer at the spot market price (ps).  An 
alternative processor may indeed be able to offer a higher price than the contracting party, as 
he does not need to account for the cost of the provided inputs. By defaulting on his contract 
obligations, however, the farmer incurs a reputation cost (φ).16 
                                                 
12 Note that, as t only enters into the equations as a net tax contribution or a net subsidy received, we do not 
explicitly account for possible benefits that producers (or processors) could obtain from possibly beneficial 
effects of public expenditures on infrastructure, agricultural research and development, and research extension 
(or, conversely, for foregone benefits of public investment that has been crowded out by the subsidies to cotton 
farmers). This can however be considered to be implicitly comprised in the value of t. 
13 African countries remain “small” exporters on the World market, unable to influence the world price. In 2007, 
the four WCA countries under consideration, which together are the first African exporter, accounted for just 
below 3 percent of world exports, while, for example, the US accounted for above 19 percent and Uzbekistan 
for above 5 percent (UN Comtrade, 2007). 
14 In a principal-agent setting (as in Kranton and Swamy, 2008), β would equal zero. Here, we keep it as general 
as possible. 
15 In this respect, this model can be viewed as a particular case of “bargaining with imperfect enforcement”, as 
described in White and Williams (2009), which implies that the weakest party in the negotiation can actually 
gain a larger share of an agreement if it must be implemented non-cooperatively as “the lot of the weaker player 
must be improved in order that he finds continuing the agreement worthwhile.” 
16 In fact, the reputation cost is a short-hand way of introducing some dynamics in the model and keeping it 
simple (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). The source of this reputation cost can be very diverse: from the loss of 
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In the absence of a formal enforcement mechanism, contract compliance can be 
ensured only by making the contract self-enforcing. This implies that the processor might 
have to increase the price paid to his cotton supplier so as to incentivize the latter to comply 
with the contract. Indeed, while the farmer will participate in the contract if his expected 
return (Y) exceeds his disagreement payoff: Y ≥   ; he will comply with the contract only if 
his payoff from compliance is at least as high as his payoffs from input diversion and side-
selling: Y ≥ max {k + l - φ; (ps – cs – ts) q – φ}, with cs and ts respectively the inefficiencies 
and government taxation patterns faced by the alternative, non-contracted buyers. The 
respective payoffs of the contract (with П the processor’s return) are then given by: 
Y = max ( + βθ;  +   – φ; (ps – cs – ts) q – φ)     (2) 
П = (p – c – t) q – Y          (3) 
On the other hand, the processor will only join the contract if his expected return 
covers his opportunity cost of capital:   . As a result; a contract will be feasible only if 
the world price is sufficient to cover each of these constraints, that is, if it satisfies the 
following condition:  
p ≥ pmin = 
q
1
max 
   ; 2     ;               (4) 
Condition (4) shows that the better the farmer’s opportunity cost of labour (high  ), 
the higher the spot-market price (ps), and the lower the reputation cost (φ), the lower contract 
feasibility is. On the other hand, it can be seen from condition (2) that the same factors would 
cause producers prices to be higher. Furthermore, processing inefficiencies (c) are expected 
to reduce contract feasibility, as well as suppress producer and processor payoffs. Finally, 
taxation by the government (t > 0) has a similar impact as processing inefficiencies, while 
subsidies by the government (t < 0) improve producer and processor payoffs as well as 
contract feasibility (as they reduce pmin).  
 
3.2 The effects of liberalisation: Model predictions 
As in Swinnen et al. (2011), we focus on two crucial, and interrelated, aspects of the 
liberalisation process: “price liberalisation”, i.e. the government no longer determines prices, 
and “market liberalisation”, i.e. the removal of state control over the structure of the cotton 
chain by allowing private trade and competition. Define T as the government’s “price policy” 
                                                                                                                                                        
future contracting opportunities and to access credit and input, over a fine which must be paid the contracted 
buyer, to a loss of face vis-à-vis other members of the local community. 
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and Z as the “market policy”. Price liberalisation is represented by ∆T > 0 and market 
liberalisation by ∆Z > 0.17 
First, price liberalisation removes government intervention in price-setting: ∂y / ∂T <0 
for t < 0 (government subsidy) and ∂y / ∂T > 0 for t > 0 (government tax).   
Second, market liberalisation is hypothesised to affect c, ps,   and φ. Competition 
indeed creates new options to side-sell: ps is expected to increase, as we move from a 
monopsony (where ps is virtually equal to zero) to a competitive environment (where it is 
high, as long as processors do not collude). Hence, ∂ps/∂Z ≥ 0. As competition increases, it 
might also bring along improved contract options ex-ante: ∂ /∂Z ≥ 0.18  In addition, the 
farmer’s reputation cost φ is likely to decrease: the more numerous processors are, the more 
expensive it gets for them to coordinate and share information (Zanardi, 2004) and the more 
alternative buyers remain after defaulting with one of them (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998). Hence, 
∂φ/∂Z ≤ 0. 
Furthermore, because of the removal of soft budget constraints and the created 
competitive pressure, market liberalisation might lead to increased processing efficiency 
(∂c/∂Z ≤ 0), for example through the removal of excessive employment or the adaptation of 
better technologies and management strategies. This is in line with Hick’s “quiet life” 
hypothesis (1935) which argues that competition brings incentives for cost minimisation and 
the removal of processing inefficiencies, as was the case in, for example, Eastern Europe and 
China (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). On the other hand, some have suggested that 
competition might increase costs (∂c/∂Z ≤ 0) by suppressing economies of scale (e.g. 
Demsetz, 1973; Guy et al., 2004), increasing transaction costs (Shervani et al., 2007) or 
lowering incentives for investing in research (e.g. Pray et al., 2005).  
If we combine these effects with equation (2), we can derive the impact of the 
orthodox reforms on the farmer’s returns, at the condition that contracts can be sustained: 


 

 



 



  
 
 

 
!
!

 
"
"

     (5) 
The first term in equation (5), which captures the effect of price liberalisation, will be 
positive (or zero) if the government taxed farmers before the reform (implying that t > 0), 
and negative (or zero) if farmers were subsidised (implying that t < 0). The second, third and 
                                                 
17 T and Z are both continuous, with T є [0;1] and increasing with the size of taxation/subsidy and Z going from 
no competition (Z = 0) to perfect competition and no constraint on private ownership (Z = 1). 
18 Note that ex-ante competition refers to competition between buyers at the time of negotiating the agreement, 
while ex-post competition relates to competition between buyers at the time of contract execution, i.e. trading. 
In the case of contract farming, ex-post competition is only possible in case of weak contract enforcement. 
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fourth terms, which capture the effect of market liberalisation on outside options, the spot-
market price and reputation costs, are non-negative. Interestingly, the third term is increasing 
in q if (but only if) the sideselling option is binding, implying that suppliers may benefit from 
any yield increase brought about by the use of specific investments. Finally, the fifth term, 
which captures the effect of market liberalisation on firms’ efficiency, will be positive if 
competitive pressure, budget pressure and private management outweigh the potentially 
negative impact of the elimination of economies of scale, increased transaction costs or 
reduced incentives to invest in research. Hence, if contracts remain sustainable after reform, 
farmers are expected to benefit from liberalisation unless a decline in efficiency and/or the 
abolition of state support counteract entirely the positive effects of increased ex-ante and ex-
post competition and lower reputation costs. In case farmers were taxed before reform and 
efficiency in the sector improves through reform, the right-hand side of equation (5) will be 
strictly positive and reform is expected to benefit farmers.  
A crucial issue, however, is the sustainability of contracting with reforms. Indeed, if it 
improves outside options for farmers, liberalisation also increases the price that has to be paid 
to farmers to ensure contract compliance, hence strengthening the constraint on the level of 
the world price needed for contracts to be sustained (pmin). Using equation (4), the aggregate 
effect of liberalisation on contract sustainability can be summed up as follows: 
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The first term of equation (6) will be positive if the sector was subsidised before 
liberalisation and negative otherwise; the second, third and fourth terms will be zero or 
positive; and, again, the sign of the last term will depend on whether efficiency is improved 
through liberalisation (in which case the fifth term will be negative and positive otherwise).  
If production was subsidised before liberalisation and processing efficiency is 
reduced, all terms in equation (6) are zero or positive, implying that liberalisation undermines 
contract feasibility (as pmin increases). If, on the other hand, production was taxed before 
liberalisation and processing efficiency improves through liberalisation, the first and the fifth 
terms are negative and may counteract the detrimental impact of increased competition on 
contract feasibility. A yield increase resulting from the use of specific inputs will increase 
contract feasibility if the first or the second term in the maximand of equation (4) is binding; 
but it will reduce contract feasibility if the third term in this maximand is binding (unless we 
allow the reputation cost to increase in q).  
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In conclusion, while farm incomes are expected to improve with price and market 
liberalisation, as long as contracts do not collapse, contracts are more likely to collapse 
because of competition. This underscores the existence of a trade-off between competition and 
“coordination”, as pointed out by Dorward, Poulton, Tschirley and their co-authors in various 
publications (e. g. Dorward et al. 1998 ; Poulton et al. 2004 ; Tschirley et al., 2010). 
This trade-off is particularly relevant in cotton as cotton is a relatively homogenous 
product. Buyers seek broadly the same quality requirements, which are imposed by the textile 
industry, which highly values homogeneity (Tschirley et al., 2009). Moreover, contrary to 
other crops, the prices fetched by different firms on the world market depend largely on the 
national origin of cotton and on the quality reputation of that origin, rather than on the 
specific reputation of different firms (Larsen, 2003). This means that non-contracted buyers 
willing to buy raw cotton should be able to obtain prices in the international market similar to 
those fetched by the ginners who pre-financed the inputs, and thus to offer a high spot-market 
price (ps). To the extent that the contracted buyers are not able to exert market power, ps 
could thus converge to p – cs – ts post-liberalisation, with cs and ts respectively the 
inefficiencies and government taxation patterns faced by the non-contracted buyers. If the 
latter are identical to those of the contracted buyers (meaning that c=cs and t=ts), equations 
(2), (3) and (4) reduce to:  
Y = max ( +βθ; (p – c – t)q – φ)       (7) 
П = pq – c – t – Y          (8) 
p ≥ pmin = 
&'
(
                       s.t. φ ≥       (9) 
With ps = p, the sideselling option translates into a simple condition for contract 
sustainability which does not depend on p or on q: φ ≥  . The condition on p implied by (9) 
is nothing more than the condition for efficient contracts, and will weaken (i.e. pmin will 
decrease) with an increasing q. Hence, while contracting can be sustained even with a nil 
reputation cost (φ=0) in the case where the initial buyer can fetch a higher price on the 
international market than that fetched by its competitors; when such quality premiums do not 
exist, there is a lower bound to φ. This implies that, whatever the efficiency gains of 
liberalisation through the elimination of c and t, if the post-liberalisation reputation cost is not 
sufficiently high (i.e. φ < ), contracts will break down (irrespective of the level of p). 
 
4. An explanation of reform effects in ESA 
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We now discuss the ex-ante expectations of reforms in ESA on farm incomes and 
contract feasibility and explain the reform outcomes, using the theoretical framework 
described above and empirical insights from the literature.  
 
Production inefficiencies 
As cotton state boards in ESA suffered rather bad reputations with respect to 
efficiency, liberalisation was expected to bring substantial gains in processing and marketing 
efficiency. Through a decrease in c (and as such of pmin), farm incomes as well as sector 
performance were expected to improve. Most reform experiences suggest that competitive 
cotton sectors are indeed more cost-efficient than concentrated sectors, and both substantially 
outperform monopolistic sectors in terms of ginning efficiency (Tschirley et al., 2010). With 
incentives for better efficiency outweighing potential losses of economies of scale, c is said to 
have been effectively reduced through liberalisation. In particular, the literature suggests that 
no negative impact of reform was found on economies of scale in research and development. 
In fact, Tschirley et al. (2009) mention that, even after reform, most ESA cotton research 
programs remained in public hands.  
The level of efficiency gains however depends on the level of pre-reform inefficiency. 
This is likely to have been smaller in countries such as Zimbabwe where the board was said 
to perform relatively well (Tschirley et al., 2009). Indications of this better performance can 
be found in the fact that yields were maintained throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while they 
significantly declined elsewhere in ESA (Table 1). As a result, in the late 1970s, yields were 
more than twice as big in Zimbabwe as they were in other ESA countries. 
 
Institutional framework and the degree of competition  
While prior to reform, there was a common belief that opening up the sector would 
lead to considerable market entry by the private sector; private market entry has been only 
gradual. As mentioned earlier, in Zambia and Zimbabwe, in particular, competition remained 
very weak in the years subsequent to reform as a remnant of the extremely concentrated pre-
reform market structure (Brambilla and Porto, forthcoming).  
In addition, the degree of competition has fluctuated as a result of different types of 
re-regulation. In Zambia, the level of competition is said to have declined during the first half 
of the 2000s when the two biggest firms began to cooperate in an attempt to fight side-selling 
(Brambilla and Porto, forthcoming) and, simultaneously, “the agents and independent buyers 
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[...] largely disappeared” (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010). Competition later resumed with the 
market entry of new “larger and better-financed ginners” (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010). States 
have also aimed at restricting market entry to buyers engaging in input-credit provision. In 
Zimbabwe, regulation of entry has become more severe since 2006, when legal requirements 
with respect to input provision by cotton ginners were enforced. Similarly, in Uganda, the 
detrimental effect of competition on the provision of inputs and extension has led the 
government to establish regional monopsony rights between 2003 and 2008 (Baffes, 2009b). 
A few ginners were allowed to operate in each zone under quota terms, which were made 
proportionate to companies’ capacity for inputs and extension provision on credit. As a result, 
Tanzania is the only country where competition has been unrestrained since the reform was 
adopted (Delpeuch and Leblois, 2011). 
 
Government taxation 
The empirical political economy literature finds that African governments (like 
governments in other developing countries) have largely taxed agriculture, especially 
exportable cash crops (e.g. Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988; Anderson and Masters, 2009; 
Swinnen et al., 2011; Bates and Block, 2010).19 This suggests that price liberalisation in ESA 
also offered great potential in terms of eliminating taxation (reducing t), resulting in better 
producer prices as well as improving sector performance by reducing pmin. 
Figure 3 depicts the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to the cotton sectors in ESA 
between 1970 and 2005. The NRA is defined as “the percentage by which government 
policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would have been without the 
government’s intervention” (Anderson and Masters, 2009, p. 11) and is, to our knowledge, 
the best proxy for estimating the evolution of t over long time periods. Apart from direct 
taxation (t), the NRA also captures exchange rate distortions.20  
                                                 
19 Various reasons have been put forward to explain this, among which, chiefly, the largely agricultural and rural 
nature of African economies. Taxation of agricultural products is indeed expected to be higher if agriculture 
occupies a larger share of the national GDP, and if the government has fewer alternative sources of income at its 
disposal. Besides, the more numerous farmers are, (i) the more costly it is to organize them (Olson, 1985) and 
(ii) the higher the costs on the rest of society are for supporting them (Swinnen 1994; 2010). In addition, 
exported cash crops are considered to be a relatively easy target for taxation, because it is easier to control 
exports than domestic market products, and because there are no local consumers for whom prices should be 
kept low (Bates, 1981). 
20 Depending on the methodology used for different countries, NRAs sometimes also include indirect taxes or 
subsidies resulting from administrative pricing and excessive post-harvest margins due to the inefficiency of 
state enterprises (see Poulton and Delpeuch, 2011, for a detailed analysis of NRA figures for cotton and 
calculation methods). 
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As shown in Figure 3, NRAs have been  significantly negative in ESA during the 
years of heavy government intervention, with the exception of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean 
exception is likely to have reflected the fact that commercial farmers, who made up for most 
of the country’s cotton until the post-independence period, were able to obtain higher prices 
out of political bargaining (as illustrated in Figure 4). In Zambia and Uganda, taxation 
actually began to decrease before the reforms, reflecting the reduction in exchange rate 
distortions brought about by structural adjustment. Yet, in the early to mid-1990s, at the time 
of reforms, there was scope for reducing taxation, especially in Tanzania. 
As expected, in the post-reform period taxation was reduced in Uganda and Tanzania, 
and gradually converged to zero. However, in Zambia and Zimbabwe, the opposite occurred. 
Worsening exchange rate distortions in the 2000s are largely responsible for the plummeting 
of the NRAs in the latter country, where the decline post-reform was most dramatic (Ndlela 
and Robinson, 2009). 
 
Overall impact on producer prices 
 Prior to reform in ESA, the expectations were overall high with regard to the scope 
for improvement of producer prices. Our model provides an ample range of rationales for 
these expectations: if contracts could be sustained, liberalisation would eliminate taxation, 
lower the reputation cost from contract breach and imply significant spot-market price 
increases given the homogeneous nature of cotton and pricing practices in the world market. 
In addition, efficiency was expected to increase as a result of market liberalisation. 
However, in hindsight, the overall high expectations from liberalisation reforms 
turned out to be overly optimistic. As suggested by FAO data in Figure 5, producer prices 
have increased post-reform only in Tanzania, and to a lesser extent in Zimbabwe, with 
significant variation over time. The key reason for disappointing performance in this respect 
in Zambia and Uganda is likely to be the imperfectly competitive nature of post-reform 
markets. In addition, as mentioned in the previous sub-section, in Zimbabwe, prices were 
already relatively high pre-reform (Larsen, 2002). Combined with the general decline in 
world cotton market prices, this explains why producer prices have stagnated or even went 
down after liberalisation. 
 
Overall impact on contract sustainability  
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As has been mentioned before, a key aspect of market performance for cotton is 
ensuring that farmers have access to inputs. If farmers face important credit constraints, 
interlinking input and output markets through contract farming is one way to overcome these 
market imperfections. Liberalisation could be expected to have mixed effects on contract 
sustainability. Positive effects would come from the removal of taxation (t), as well as of 
existing marketing and processing inefficiencies (c). Conversely, potential negative impacts 
on contract sustainability could have resulted from higher outside options for farmers (higher 
 and ps) and lower reputation costs (φ), with ultimately negative effects on input 
consumption and on yields and production. 
Focusing on post-reform performance in terms of yields, which are directly affected 
by contract sustainability through input use, the picture is indeed mixed – ranging from 
sustained yield increase in Zambia to long-term decline in Zimbabwe and variation over time 
in Uganda and Tanzania.  
As depicted in Figure 6, in Zambia, yields have declined in the immediate post-reform 
period, but subsequently increased  rapidly and strongly before declining a bit and stagnating 
at about 160 percent of their pre-reform level. This good performance in terms of yields 
seems to indicate that contracts have been sustained to a large extent after liberalisation. This 
is because, as already mentioned, competition has remained relatively restricted and, when it 
has, input supply systems have been sustained to a large extent. Tschirley et al. (2009) even 
show that service provision has been used as a strategy for non-price competition in Zambia, 
suggesting that, at low levels, competition stimulates rather than suppresses service provision 
and yield growth (Tschirley et al., 2009).  
In Zimbabwe, the medium run increase in yields has been much more modest (this 
might reflect the already higher level of yields pre-reform) and the decline in the longer term 
far stronger:  despite one or two better years, average yields have been below the pre-reform 
level for about a decade.  
In Tanzania, the country where competition has increased most significantly, yields 
declined significantly in the immediate post-reform period and remained below the pre-
reform level for a decade before slowly recovering.  
In Uganda, finally, a short-lived increase in yields gave rise to a significant decline, 
with yields remaining below pre-reform levels for five years. They subsequently recovered 
and peaked to over two times their pre-reform level, albeit with considerable year-to-year 
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variation. This period of higher yields corresponds to the times when the government re-
regulated the sector and restricted competition among buyers. 
In short, in post-liberalisation ESA markets, defaulting crises have occurred when 
competition increased over a certain level triggering direct implications in terms of input use 
and yields. This led Tschirley et al. (2010) to conclude that “tipping points may exist, in 
which the entry of additional companies can dramatically change the prospects of co-
ordination for input supply and extension.” Our definition of pmin precisely captures this 
constraint when the impact of increased competition on ex-ante contract opportunities, ex-
post outside options and reputation outweighs the impact of increased efficiency.  
In conclusion, as predicted by the model, liberalisation seems to have impacted 
returns and contract sustainability conversely: countries where the price response was the 
weakest (Zambia and Uganda) were also those where contracting and productivity increased 
most (Figures 5 and 6). 
 
5. Expected effects of liberalisation in WCA 
The impact of reforms in ESA (and its contrast with the expected impact pre-reform) 
inform and feed the debate on liberalisation in WCA. We now outline a set of predictions on 
the expected outcomes of reforms in WCA, combining our theoretical framework, the lessons 
of reform experiences in ESA and differences in the production and market structure between 
the two regions. 
 
Production inefficiencies 
The comparative literature on cotton policies in SSA reveals that parastatals have 
historically been less inefficient in WCA than boards in ESA. One indication of this is that, 
from the 1960s through the 1980s, as government-controlled organisations increased their 
involvement in the cotton sector, performance declined in most ESA countries, eventually 
resulting in debts and delayed payments to farmers as well as declining yields (Tschirley et 
al., 2009). During the same period, in WCA, yields increased three-fold (Table 1, Figure 1). 
As a result, in  1990, cotton yields in ESA were on average over 40 percent lower than in 
WCA while they were over twice as big during most of the 1960s (Figure 1).  
There is indeed some evidence that, in times of taxation, WCA governments were at 
least partially using the collected funds for research and extension, as well as the 
development of infrastructure, hereby benefiting the farmers (Townsend, 1999). Comparing 
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the performance of cotton sectors in Tanzania and in Mali, Gillham et al. (1995) also found 
that while (i) “good leadership and management and integration of adaptive research, 
extension and production in Mali ensured that supplies of pure, quality seed were available to 
the farmers and that new developments in varieties and production technology reached them 
rapidly”, (ii) “Tanzania is reflective of other East African countries where there was poor 
training of cotton professionals, inefficient administration and an absence of any integration 
of research, extension, production and marketing”. 
The efficiency of WCA parastatals is now said to be declining. However the benefits 
of past investment seem to have enduring positive effects (Tschirley et al., 2009) suggesting 
less scope for efficiency gains from reform in WCA than there was in ESA. Hence, the 
expected impact of reform on our model parameter c is not clear-cut.  
 
Government intervention 
While NRAs were more negative in WCA than in ESA for most of the pre-2000 
period (implying that farmers were taxed to a larger extent), they have increasingly differed 
since then. Based on his own NRA-type calculations, Baffes (2007) reports that producer 
prices were maintained at higher levels than companies could afford between 1985 and 1993 
and again since 1998 (producer prices being subsidized at an equivalent rate of 6 and 9 
percent during these two periods, respectively). Anecdotal evidence for the past few years 
over which NRA figures are not yet available suggests that such subsidization has not ceased 
since 2007 (e.g. Kaminski et al. 2011).  
This divergence in government intervention is likely linked to the particular role of 
cotton in WCA. The governments in the region indeed have had few options other than to use 
the cotton sector as a resource  to finance their public budgets. This is still largely the case, 
especially in Benin and Burkina Faso, where cotton accounted for more than 50 percent of 
the total merchandise export value in 2006 (Figure 7). This has meant that when world prices 
strongly declined, producer prices were sustained at their historical level to avoid production 
disruptions (Figure 8).21 Such transfers to farms have ensured contract sustainability but 
                                                 
21 The countercyclical nature of support to the agricultural sector is believed to be a common feature of 
agricultural policies (e.g. Gawande and Krishna, 2003; Swinnen, 2010). One possible explanation is that 
government preferences exhibit loss aversion (Tovar, 2009) and therefore tend to protect especially the sectors 
where profitability is on the decline. Another argument can be understood from a simple perspective of rent 
maximization: if cotton is governments’ major source of income, it is rational for governments to subsidize their 
cotton sectors at times of low world prices. Nubupko and Keita (2005) for example find that, in Mali, the 
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caused financial losses for the ginning companies, which ultimately had to be covered by 
budget support. This resulted in positive NRAs, as shown in Figure 9. The removal of these 
subsidies is likely to have a negative impact on producer prices; especially for less efficient 
farmers, which were subsidised to an even greater extent because of pan-territorial pricing. 
Hence, unless these trends change as a result of the very recent increase in the world price, t 
is expected to increase post-reform in the WCA context, in sharp contrast to the expected 
reduction in t pre-reform in ESA. This can be considered a major factor triggering resistance 
to reform in WCA, as it would both have a depressing impact on producer prices, and invoke 
a higher level of contract breakdown.  
 
Farm outside options 
In contrast with ESA, WCA farmers may have fewer alternative crops to switch to if 
cotton schemes collapse. Goreux (2003) argues that, in most cases, the farmers’ only 
alternative to the cotton/maize rotation scheme, is planting cowpea, with lower yields (and 
profitability). This would imply that in WCA, the farmer’s ex-ante outside option () is lower 
than in ESA, and consequently, that cotton schemes could be sustained at lower levels of p, 
but also that producer prices for cotton in a market-based system might be lower in WCA 
than in ESA.  
 
Institutional organisation and the degree of competition  
Because parastatals have been the sole operator of cotton purchasing, selling and 
input provision for over half a century in WCA, it seems that the experiences of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, where this was also the case, are more relevant benchmarks for what could 
happen in WCA than those of Tanzania or Uganda. Hence, based on pre-reform institutional 
arrangements, strong competition should not be expected as a result of reforms in this region.   
What is more, the partial reforms introduced since the early 2000s provide additional signs 
that competition might be hard to achieve. In Benin, where the private sector has been 
allowed to enter ginning (but not to compete as cotton is administratively allocated to the 
different firms), after the initial entry of numerous private buyers on the market, the degree of 
concentration is increasing to the point where the sector is said to resemble a private 
                                                                                                                                                        
negative macroeconomic impact of a 20 percent drop in producer prices would be bigger than the positive 
impact of the budget saving that would allow such a reduction. 
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monopsony (Gergely, 2009). As a result, the impact of competition on  , ps and φ is likely to 
be more modest than in ESA. 
 
Overall impact on producer prices  
While reforms in ESA in the 1990s were expected to bring higher prices to farmers, 
expectations for price improvement after liberalisation are significantly more modest in WCA 
today. First, price liberalisation would likely eliminate subsidies, not taxes. Second, although 
some efficiency gains could be expected, it seems that in general, they will be more modest 
than in ESA. Third, the positive price effect resulting from increased competition is expected 
to be small since WCA markets are likely to achieve only limited competition. Finally, scarce 
opportunities for switching to other crops would reinforce the potentially negative impact of a 
concentrated private cotton sector in WCA.  
 
Overall impact on contract sustainability  
According to our model, the removal of subsidies and the more modest expectations 
on efficiency improvements are two reasons why liberalisation in WCA might be more 
detrimental for contract feasibility than in ESA. On the other hand, other initial conditions 
such as the nature of pre-reform institutional organisation (and limited expectations with 
respect to the level of post-reform competition) and lower farm outside options predict that 
contracting in WCA could remain sustainable even after reform, at least in the short run. This 
however holds only if the entry of a limited number does not lead to the extreme scenario 
where ps = p and high reputation costs cannot be maintained.  
Because of environmental conditions, the yield improvement from using inputs in 
WCA is greater than in ESA where cotton can be produced relatively profitably without 
inputs (i.e. q is larger in WCA). This implies that the supply response to contract breakdown 
would be more significant. WCA countries are also, on average, more dependent on cotton 
both at the household level and at the macro level (Figure 7).This, again, underscores the 
greater sensitivity of a liberalisation of cotton markets in the latter region. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper uses a stylised contracting model to investigate the link between market 
structure and equity and efficiency in SSA cotton sectors, explain the outcome of reforms in 
ESA and analyze their potential consequences in WCA. We argue that the level of the world 
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price and of government intervention, the nature of pre-reform institutional organisation, as 
well as the degree of parastatal inefficiency, all contribute to making reforms less attractive to 
farmers and governments in WCA today, as compared to ESA in the mid 1990s. We illustrate 
our arguments with empirical observations on the performance of cotton sectors across SSA. 
By shifting the objective of the cotton policy from maximal production to efficient 
production, orthodox reforms are likely to have detrimental effects especially for farmers 
with high transaction costs of dealing with them, who often are also the poorest. In pointing 
at the limitations of orthodox market reforms in the WCA context, however, we do not intend 
to minimise the need for change: the present system is depleting public budgets, while failing 
to bring about yield increases in most countries of the region since the mid-1980s. The 
breakdown of inefficient contracts might thus ultimately be beneficial to the national 
economy if freed resources can be used to support poor farmers in finding alternative sources 
of income. Whereas governments in WCA have historically presented cotton production 
promotion as one of the most efficient ways of pulling rural populations out of poverty, they 
should now try to improve opportunities for diversification, or design more efficient social 
safety nets that target recipients based on needs rather than on cultivation choices. Moreover, 
from a macro-economic perspective, a movement out of cotton production of the less 
efficient farmers could help to reduce the strong dependency on a single commodity.  
This is all easier said than done: market policies are more easily implemented in 
developing countries with limited budgets and administrative capacity than social policies 
(Brooks, 2011). However, this paper suggests that the very strong focus on cotton reforms, 
both by donors and governments, should maybe be put into perspective and more attention 
should be paid to designing global agricultural and rural policies that create opportunities for 
farmers to move out of cotton production.  
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Tables  
 
Table 1: Growth of cotton productivity (yields) in ESA and WCA countries, 1961-2009 
(1960s=100) 
 
Country/Region 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s§ 
      
WCA      
Benin 100 240 317 356 337 
Burkina Faso 100 235 408 423 462 
Chad 100 130 208 197 187 
Mali 100 240 301 276 238 
Average 100 211 301 303 291 
      
ESA      
Tanzania 100 108 83 109 138 
Uganda 100 74 61 108 195 
Zambia 100* 64 57 75 107 
Zimbabwe 100 100 95 58 53 
Average 100 90 80 78 100 
      
Source: FAOStat (September 2, 2010) 
§ For the 2000s, data was available until 2009, unless specified otherwise. 
* countries with * have data for 1963-1969 
 
 
Table 2: Cotton production growth in ESA and WCA countries, 1961-2009 (1960s=100) 
 
Country/Region 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s§ 
      
WCA      
Benin 100 301 671 2768 3259 
Burkina Faso 100 282 728 1448 3380 
Chad 100 121 109 166 162** 
Mali 100 387 709 1595 1746 
Average 100 191 303 694 952 
      
ESA      
Tanzania 100 112 95 111 147** 
Uganda 100 69 11 17 31 
Zambia 100* 299 1222 2024 3454 
Zimbabwe 100 419 624 564 728** 
Average 100 111 97 106 146 
      
Source: FAOStat (September 2, 2010) 
§ For the 2000s, data was available until 2009, unless specified otherwise. 
* countries with * have data for 1963-1969 
** countries with ** have data for 2000-2008 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Cotton productivity (yields) in ESA and WCA countries, 1961-2009 (Hg/Ha) 
 
 
Source: FAOStat (September 2, 2010) 
Note: WCA includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali; and ESA Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
  
 
Figure 2: Cotton production in ESA and WCA countries, 1961-2009 (MT) 
 
 
Source: FAOStat (September 2, 2010) 
Note: WCA includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali; and ESA Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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Figure 3: NRAs to the cotton sector in countries of ESA, 1970-2005 
 
Source: Poulton and Delpeuch (2011) 
Note: ESA includes Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
 
 
Figure 4: Producer prices in countries of ESA, 1976-2004 (US$/MT) 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2007) – “national spreadsheets”.  
Note: ESA includes Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
 
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
19
76
19
81
19
86
19
91
19
96
20
01
Year
A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
N
R
A
s
Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
100
200
300
400
500
600
19
76
19
81
19
86
19
91
19
96
20
01
Year
Pr
od
uc
er
 p
ri
ce
Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
32 
 
Figure 5: Producer prices in ESA countries post-reform 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2007) – “national spreadsheets” 
Note: the price index is 100 in the year of reform. ESA includes Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
 
 
Figure 6: Growth of cotton productivity (yields) in ESA post-reform  
 
 
Source: FAOStat (September 2, 2010) 
Note: the yield index is 100 in the year of reform. ESA includes Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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Figure 7: Cotton export as a share of merchandise export value in ESA and WCA 
countries, 1961-2007 
 
Source: FAOStat (September 2, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 8: Producer prices in ESA and WCA compared to the A index, 1976-2004 
(US$/MT) 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2007) 
Note: WCA includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali; and ESA Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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Figure 9: NRAs to the cotton sector in ESA and WCA, 1970-2005 
  
Source: Poulton and Delpeuch (2011) 
Note: WCA includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali; and ESA Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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